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BREACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO ENSURE ITS
ENFORCEMENT: THE RELIANCE BY THE ICTY ON ILLEGAL
CAPTURE1
James Sloan2
1. INTRODUCTION
In an address to the United Nations General Assembly on 7 November 1995, An-
tonio Cassese, then President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY),3 highlighted the difficulty of enforcing international criminal
justice in the absence of state cooperation. To emphasise his point, Cassese offered
an apt - if somewhat inelegant - analogy: he likened the Tribunal to a limbless
giant, dependent on the 'artificial limbs' of the enforcement agencies of UN
Member States. First among the various areas cited by Cassese where the Tribunal
depended upon state cooperation was the arrest of suspected criminals living
within the borders of those states.4 Over nine years later the problem remained
acute. In a 23 November 2004 address to the Security Council, the Prosecutor of
the ICTY, Carla Del Ponte, highlighted failures on the part of the governments of
Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina to arrest indictees
and turn them over to the Tribunal.5 In particular, she mentioned the lack of
cooperation by Belgrade as 'the single most important obstacle faced by the
1. ©J. Sloan, 2005.
2. Lecturer in public international law at the University of Glasgow. I am extremely grateful to
Professor Tom Franck and Ms Catriona Drew for generously agreeing to read an earlier draft of this
article and for their helpful comments.
3. Also referred to as 'the Tribunal' or 'the International Tribunal'.
4. '[T]he decisions, orders and requests of the International Tribunal can only be enforced by
others, namely national authorities. Unlike domestic criminal courts, the Tribunal has no enforcement
agencies at its disposal: without the intermediary of national authorities, it cannot execute arrest war-
rants; it cannot seize evidentiary material, it cannot compel witnesses to give testimony, it cannot
search the scenes where crimes have been allegedly committed. For all these purposes, it must turn to
State authorities and request them to take action. Our Tribunal is like a giant who has no arms and no
legs. To walk and work, he needs artificial limbs. These artificial limbs are the State authorities; with-
out their help the Tribunal cannot operate.' Address of Antonio Cassese, President of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 7 No-
vember 1995.
5. ICTY Press Release, CDP/P.I.S./917-e, 23 November 2004 <www.un.org/icty/latest/index.hrm>.
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Tribunal'6 in the implementation of its strategy to complete its trials by the end of
2008.7
In the light of the widely accepted view that the Tribunal could not conduct a
trial in the absence of the accused,8 there was a genuine risk that if states failed to
execute the Tribunal's arrest warrants, it could indeed become a limbless giant.
While such non-cooperation violates states' obligations in international law,9 the
Statute provides no remedy for it. The judges of the Tribunal attempted to address
this shortcoming by amending its Rules of Procedure and Evidence10 to provide for
the reporting of state non-cooperation to the Security Council" and to permit hear-
ings to reconfirm indictments against accused who were not present before the
Tribunal under the 'Rule 61 procedure'.12 It is fair to say that neither tactic
achieved very much.13 A new sense of hope emerged with the end of the conflict
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the signing of the Dayton Agreement in December
1995.14 By the terms of this agreement, a multinational military Implementation
Force for Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR) - later to be replaced by the Stabilisa-
tion Force (SFOR)15 - was established to ensure compliance with military aspects
of the Dayton Agreement. Despite an initial reluctance to get involved in the arrest
6. According to Del Ponte, there were some 20 indictees still at large in the three countries listed,
including key indictees such as Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Ante Gotovina.
7. As required by the Security Council; see SC Res. 1503 (2003) para. 7.
8. While not specifically provided for in the ICTY Statute, adopted 25 May 1993 under SC Res.
827, as amended (hereafter, Statute); the Secretary-General's report commenting on the Statute indi-
cates that '[a] trial should not commence until the accused is physically present before the Interna-
tional Tribunal'. See 'Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council
resolution 808 (1993)', UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 101 (hereafter, Secretary-General's
Report).
9. In the words of the Trial Chamber: 'As the Secretary General of the United Nations confirmed in
his report on the establishment of this Tribunal, "[a]n order by a Trial Chamber for the surrender or
transfer of persons to the custody of the International Tribunal shall be considered to be the application
of an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations".' Prosecutor v.
Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, Decision on Defense Motion Challenging the Exercise of Juris-
diction by the Tribunal, 9 October 2002, para. 48 (hereafter, Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture).
10. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted pursuant to Art. 15 of the Statute, 14 March 1994, as
amended (hereafter, Rule(s)).
11. See, e.g., Rule Ibis.
12. Rule 61 sets out a procedure whereby a three-judge panel may be convened to consider the
evidence in a case in the absence of the accused and, if there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the accused has committed all or any of the crimes charged, to issue a further arrest warrant.
13. Reports were made to the Security Council regarding the lack of state cooperation in arresting
Nikolic (whose case is discussed infra) and a Rule 61 hearing was held which resulted in the reconfir-
mation of the indictment against him and the issuing of an international arrest warrant. See Prosecutor
v. Dragan Nikolic, aka "Jenki", Case No. IT-94-2-R61, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Trial Chamber, 20 October 1995. Nevertheless, he remained at
large for a further six and a half years.
14. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 December 1995.
15. On 12 December 1996 the Security Council authorised the Member States to establish SFOR as
the legal successor to IFOR, SC Res. 1088 (1996).
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process, SOFR effected numerous arrests in Bosnia and Herzegovina.16 As SFOR
had no mandate outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, indictees residing in Croatia or
Serbia and Montenegro remained largely unaffected by its authority. Nevertheless,
SFOR did play a role in the transfer to The Hague of at least two indictees from
Serbia and Montenegro; what is less clear is whether SFOR had any involvement
in their highly unorthodox capture.
This discussion will consider the cases of Stevan Todorovic and Dragan Nikolic,
each of whom was captured from Serbia and Montenegro in suspicious circum-
stances, removed from that country against their will and turned over to SFOR
which, in turn, transferred them to the ICTY.17 In separate proceedings, Todorovic
and Nikolic argued that the ICTY lacked jurisdiction to decide their cases as they
had each been captured in a manner that violated international human rights law
and state sovereignty. As we shall see, in the Todorovic case, the issue of whether
illegal capture impeded the ICTY's jurisdiction to try an individual was avoided
(along with potentially embarrassing disclosure by SFOR of any involvement it
may have had in the capture) by means of a last-minute plea agreement. In the
Nikolic case, the impact of illegal capture was addressed both at the trial and
appeal levels, with each Chamber taking an entirely different approach. The Trial
Chamber concluded that neither state sovereignty nor international human rights
law had been violated; as such, it did not need to consider the impact of an illegal
capture on its jurisdiction. The Appeals Chamber, largely disregarding the findings
of the lower Chamber, operated on the assumption that the sovereignty of Serbia
and Montenegro and the fundamental human rights of Nikolic had been violated.
Despite this, it indicated, in a perfunctorily reasoned judgement, that it was content
to ignore such violations in all but the most exceptional circumstances.
2. THE TODOROVIC CASE
Stefan Todorovic, a Bosnian Serb, was indicted by the ICTY on 21 July 1995 for
crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and war
crimes.18 He was alleged to have committed acts of rape, murder and torture
against Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Moslems, and others while he was chief of police
16. For a partial list of accused who have been brought before the ICTY through the intervention of
SFOR, see S. Lamb, 'The powers of arrest of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia', 70 BY1L (1999) p. 167, n. 3.
17. The first accused to make a claim of illegal capture before the ICTY was Slavko Dokmanovic,
who was transferred to the Tribunal after being lured out of Serbia and Montenegro and into Croatia
by means of a joint effort between the Office of the Prosecutor and a UN mission. Prosecutor v. Mile
Mrsksic, Miroslav Radio, Veselin Sljivancanin and Slavko Dokmanovic, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT. The
Trial Chamber found that the trickery used by the OTP did not amount to kidnapping, as he had
alleged, and that the conduct was 'consistent with the principles of international law and the sover-
eignty of [Serbia and Montenegro]'. Ibid., para. 57 (the Trial Chamber emphasised the fact that Dok-
manovic left the Serbia and Montenegro willingly and was not arrested until he was outside that state).
18. See Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/1 -S, Sentencing Judgement, Trial Cham-
ber, 31 July 2001.
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in the Bosanski Samac municipality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After remaining
at large for over three years, he was captured and transferred to the Tribunal in
September 1998 following what he described as a 'kidnapping'.19 According to
Todorovic, on 27 September 1998, four armed, masked men burst into his home in
Zlatibor in western Serbia, gagged and blindfolded him and beat him with a base-
ball bat,20 and then smuggled him out of the country and into Bosnia and Herzego-
vina.21 Upon arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an SFOR helicopter met him and
he was taken into SFOR custody and later handed over to Tribunal authorities.22
Todorovic brought a series of motions which focussed on the alleged illegalities
in his forcible removal from Serbia and Montenegro.23 He argued that, as a result
of the illegality of his capture, the Tribunal was required to order the dismissal of
the indictment against him and his release from custody.24 An important part of his
argument was that SFOR was involved in his illegal capture - a claim for which
some support existed in newspaper reports25 - and he focussed on obtaining infor-
mation to prove this. Over the strenuous objections of SFOR,26 Todorovic obtained
orders from the Tribunal requiring SFOR to provide disclosure.27 Due to the way in
19. At his initial appearance before the ICTY on 30 September 1998, Todorovic advised the Trial
Chamber that he 'did not feel well because he had received a heavy blow with a baseball bat over his
head "during the kidnapping'". See Prosecution response to the appeal brief of the accused/appellant
Stevan Todorovic, filed 4 August 1999, para. 9, n. 8.
20. Ibid.
21. See S. Castle, 'Bosnian police chief may escape war crimes trial', in The Independent, 16
August 2000, p. 11. See also T. Walker, 'SAS carried out Serbian raid', in The Times, 11 November
1998.
22. Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic, Milan Simic, Miroslav Tadic, Stevan Todorovic, and Simo Zaric,
Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others,
Trial Chamber, 18 October 2000, para. 11 (hereafter, Todorovic Decision on Motion for Judicial As-
sistance).
23. For a discussion of the various motions, see J. Sloan, 'Prosecutor v. Todorovic: illegal capture
as an obstacle to the exercise of international criminal jurisdiction', \6LJIL (2003) p. 85.
24. As summarised by the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic, Milan Simic, Miroslav
Tadic, Stevan Todorovic, and Simo Zaric, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision Stating Reasons for Trial
Chamber's Order of 4 March 1999 on Defence Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on the Arrest of the
Accused Todorovic, Trial Chamber, 25 March 1999, p. 2.
25. Some newspaper accounts alleged that his capturers were 'bounty hunters' paid by NATO or by
the US government. See Castle, supra n. 21 and Walker, supra n. 21. See also S. Davids, 'NATO
"gang" jailed over Todorovic', in The Birmingham Post, 12 December 2000, p. 9, where it is reported
that '[n]ine Serbs who were allegedly paid £15,500 by NATO to capture and smuggle [Todorovic] into
Bosnia, were yesterday jailed for kidnapping'. Other reports assert that members of the British or US
Forces were involved in the capture. See Walker, supra n. 21, and J. Swain, 'Serb snatched by rogue
bounty hunter,' in The Sunday Times, 23 July 2000.
26. For example, Todorovic had received a letter from the Office of the Legal Advisor of SFOR,
Colonel James M. Coyne, dated 24 March 2000, declining to provide the material sought and stating
'It is the position of SFOR that the ICTY has no authority to order SFOR to disclose any information.'
Todorovic Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance, supra n. 22, para. 5.
27. The Trial Chamber ordered SFOR and the North Atlantic Council, as well as the 33 states
participating in SFOR, to provide Todorovic with evidence relating to his arrest, including the identi-
ties of the individuals who were involved with his arrest. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber issued a
subpoena requiring the testimony of the Commanding General of SFOR. See Todorovic Decision on
Motion for Judicial Assistance, supra n. 22.
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which the arguments were put forward in the motions,28 the Trial Chamber did not
address the question of the impact the accused's apparently illegal capture had on
its jurisdiction to hear the case.29 Such arguments would, in the normal course,
have been heard after Todorovic had been provided with the ordered information,
which the Trial Chamber had determined was required in order for him to make his
argument based on illegal capture.
However, an airing of the facts and a determination on the issues relating to
illegal capture was not to be. Instead, almost immediately after the Trial Chamber
issued its order requiring disclosure from SFOR, a plea agreement was entered into
between the ICTY's Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and Todorovic. According to
its terms, the OTP would drop all counts against Todorovic but one and, in return,
Todorovic would cease his pursuit of information from SFOR and cooperate with
the OTP in relation to information and evidence regarding the events in the former
Yugoslavia.30 As envisaged by the plea agreement,31 Todorovic was sentenced to
ten years' imprisonment for the single count to which he pleaded guilty. Despite
assurances of OTP officials that '[absolutely nothing has been sacrificed',32 it is
clear that Todorovic received a relatively light sentence. Whether SFOR had invol-
vement in Todorovic's capture was to remain forever undisclosed. The issues relat-
ing to the impact the nature of the capture would have on the Trial Chamber's
jurisdiction were left undecided in the Todorovic case;33 however, they were to re-
emerge before long in the Nikolic case, to which we now turn.
28. The OPT and SFOR took an approach whereby it was argued that the information should not be
disclosed to the accused as, even assuming all the allegations were true, dismissal of the indictment
and release of the accused were inappropriate remedies in the circumstances. The Trial Chamber,
however, did not accept this and ordered the disclosure without entering into a discussion of the
issues relating to illegal capture and what remedies might be appropriate. See Sloan, supra n. 23.
29. The bulk of the decision considered whether the Tribunal was authorised to order disclosure
from SFOR and whether it was appropriate to do so in the circumstances.
30. See Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, Trial Cham-
ber, 31 July 2001, paras. 5 et seq.
31. According to the terms of the plea agreement, both sides agreed that the OTP would recom-
mend to a Trial Chamber a sentence of not less than five and not more than twelve years' imprison-
ment and that neither party would appeal. Ibid., para. 11.
32. See J. Cogan, 'International criminal courts and fair trials: difficulties and prospects', 27 Yale
ML (2002) pp. I l l at 127, where he quotes a representative of the OTP.
33. The OTP, in its pleadings, did elaborate its views on whether refusal of jurisdiction by the Trial
Chamber was an appropriate step in the circumstances. Its arguments centred on an assertion that, in
the circumstances, it would have been an abuse of the Trial Chamber's discretion to order that the
indictment against Todorovic be dismissed and that he be released; such a remedy was only available
in the most egregious situations and the conduct he alleged was not sufficiently egregious.
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3. THE NIKOLld CASE
3.1 The Trial Chamber's decision on the effect of the arrest
Dragan Nikolic, the ICTY's first indictee, remained at large from November 1994
- when he was indicted for 24 counts of crimes against humanity, violations of the
laws or customs of war and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions34 - until
April 2000, On the evening of 21 April 2000, he was abducted from Serbia and
Montenegro by unknown captors, smuggled across the Drina River and into
Bosnia and Herzegovina and handed over to what is reported to have been a US
contingent35 of SFOR. He was then transferred to the ICTY in The Hague where he
pleaded not guilty to all charges against him at his initial appearance on 28 April
2000. In motions lodged with a Trial Chamber on May 17 and 29 October 2001,36
Nikolic alleged that his capture had violated the national sovereignty of Serbia and
Montenegro and his internationally guaranteed human rights.37 He argued that the
breaches were of 'such a magnitude that even absent the involvement of SFOR or
[the] Prosecution', the only appropriate remedy was for the indictment against him
to be dismissed and his immediate return to Serbia and Montenegro to be or-
dered.38 He described his capture as 'pernicious'39 and 'tainted with illegality'40
and asserted that 'a judicial body set up with ... the objectives of preserving
human rights can have no proper option but to make it plain that jurisdiction will
not be entertained in such circumstances'.41
34. Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic a/k/a "Jenki", Case No. IT-94-2-I, Indictment, 1 November
1994. His indictment was amended several times by the Tribunal. The 'crimes were allegedly com-
mitted by the accused during 1992 in the Vlasenica region of eastern Bosnia. Most of the crimes
alleged are said to have occurred within the Susica camp, a former military installation converted by
Bosnian Serbs into a detention camp of which Nikolic is alleged to have been the commander'. See
Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture, supra n. 9, para. 2.
35. Z. Cvijanovic and V. Zimonjic, 'Belgrade crackdown: bounty hunters strike inside Serbia to
seize war crimes suspects', in The Independent, 18 May 2000, p. 14.
36. The defendant's initial motion in this regard, 'Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia Upon Illegal-
ity of Arrest Following Upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused and
Co-related Abuse of Process Within the Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under
Rule 72', 17 May 2001 (hereafter, Defendant's Motion of 17 May 2001), was supplemented and
modified by a second motion, 'Motion to Determine Issues as Agreed Between the Parties and the
Trial Chamber as Being Fundamental to the Resolution of the Accused's Status Before the Tribunal in
Respect of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Rule 72 and Generally, the Nature of the Relationship
Between the OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of any Illegal Conduct Material to the Accused,
His Arrest and Subsequent Detention', 29 October 2001 (hereafter, Defendant's Motion of 29 October
2001).
37. Defendant's Motion of 29 October 2001, supra n. 36, para. 16. See also Nikolic Decision on
Illegal Capture, supra n. 9, paras. 24-25.
38. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture, supra n. 9, para. 25
39. Defendant's Motion of 17 May 2001, supra n. 36, para. 11.
40. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture, supra n. 9, para. 25
41. Defendant's Motion of 17 May 2001, supra n. 36, para. 11.
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In its decision of 9 October 2002,42 the Trial Chamber denied Nikolic the relief
he requested. The Trial Chamber divided its reasoning into two parts. First, it con-
sidered whether the conduct of the alleged kidnappers could be attributed to SFOR
or the OTP. Because the defence had agreed for the purposes of the motions that
'the apprehension and transportation into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina
was undertaken by unknown individuals having no connection with SFOR and/or
the Tribunal',43 this argument was a difficult one to make. Nevertheless, counsel
for Nikolic tried, arguing that SFOR had adopted the captors' previous illegal be-
haviour and that, as a result, the illegal behaviour attached to the Tribunal.44 The
Trial Chamber rejected the assertion that SFOR had adopted the illegal conduct,
finding instead that by detaining the accused and transferring him to the Tribunal
it merely did as it was obliged to under the Tribunal's Statute and Rules. As a
result, it determined that the claim that SFOR's 'illegal' conduct could be attribu-
ted to the OTP was moot.45
In the second part of its decision, the Trial Chamber turned to the question of
whether 'the illegal arrest in itself constitutes a direct obstacle to the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Tribunal'.46 In order to address this question, the Trial Chamber
considered the two different approaches in national law regarding illegal interstate
capture, each conveniently summarised by a Latin maxim: male captus, bene de-
tentus (i.e., a person improperly seized may nevertheless be properly detained) and
male captus, male detentus (i.e., the detention of a person improperly seized is
itself improper). Under the first approach, the circumstances of the capture of the
accused would be irrelevant, because the 'court may exercise jurisdiction over an
accused person regardless of how that person has come into the jurisdiction of that
court'.47 Under the second approach, the national court would consider the circum-
stances of the accused's capture and, if they were improper (or sufficiently improp-
er), refuse jurisdiction.48 While the Trial Chamber avoided explicitly endorsing
either approach, it indicated a move away from the male captus, bene detentus
42. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture, supra n. 9.
43. Ibid., para. 21. This concession was made despite the existence of reports that the captors had
been paid by foreign sources to deliver Nikolic to SFOR's US contingent. See Cvijanovic and Zi-
monjic, supra n. 35. One of the reasons counsel for Nikolic suggested that the case proceed on the
basis of an admitted set of facts was 'to avoid the quagmire of enquiry, allegation and counter-allega-
tion that typified the approach of the parties in [the similar case of] Todorovic'. See 'Notice of Appeal
from the Judgement, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure, of Trial Chamber
II dated the 9th day of October 2002 concerning the Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of
Jurisdiction by the Tribunal', filed by the defendant on 7 November 2002. As we shall see below, it
was in large measure because of this concession that the Trial Chamber was able to find that there had
been no illegal behaviour associated with Nikolic's capture.
44. Based either on SFOR's status as an agent of the Prosecution or, in the alternative, based on the
OTP ratifying SFOR's conduct. See Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture, supra n. 9, para. 32.
45. Ibid., paras. 68 and 69. As noted by the Trial Chamber at para. 69: 'Whatever the relationship
between SFOR and the Prosecution, no attribution to the Prosecution can take place.'
46. Ibid., para. 70.
47. Ibid.
48. 'In the view of the defence, this Tribunal should apply the principle of male captus, male
detentus, meaning that an irregularity has occurred in the arrest of the accused and therefore should
bar any further exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal.' Ibid.
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approach, with its total disregard of the issue of how the defendant came before the
judicial body, by examining the facts relating to Nikolic's illegal arrest.49 More-
over, it specifically applied aspects of some of the national decisions which fol-
lowed the male captus, male detentus approach.50
The Trial Chamber considered the breaches of international law alleged by Ni-
kolic in two categories: those relating to a violation of state sovereignty and those
relating to a violation of international human rights or the rule of law.si In each
case it ruled that there had been no violation of international law.52 In making its
determination that there had been no violation of the sovereignty of Serbian and
Montenegro, the Trial Chamber relied heavily on the defence concession that, for
the purposes of the motions, there was no connection between his capture and
SFOR or the OTP.53 On the question of whether there was a violation of human
rights or the rule of law, the Trial Chamber held that it must undertake 'a balancing
exercise in order to assess all the factors of relevance in the case at hand and in
order to conclude whether, in light of all these factors, the Chamber can exercise
jurisdiction over the accused'.54 The Trial Chamber considered the level of serious-
ness of the mistreatment55 and whether 'persons acting for SFOR or the Prosecu-
tion were involved'.56 It held that even without the involvement of SFOR or the
Prosecution, it would be 'extremely difficult to justify the exercise of jurisdiction
over a person if that person was brought into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal after
having been seriously mistreated'.57 Here, however, based on the agreed facts, in-
cluding, once again, the agreement by the defence that, for the purposes of the
motions, there was no link between Nikolic's capture and SFOR or the OTP, the
Trial Chamber was able to find there had been no human rights or due process
violation. In short, as the Trial Chamber was able to conclude that there was no
49. The OTP, too, was unwilling to go so far as endorsing a strict male captus, bene detentus
approach for the Tribunal, arguing instead that national precedents 'do not present a consistent picture
of the validity, or not, of the maxim male captus, bene detentus'. See Nikolic Decision on Illegal
Capture, supra n. 9, para. 72. It argued that even if the male captus, male detentus approach was
favoured in national law, it was inapplicable in Nikolic's case because his capture did not violate
international law.
50. For example, it relied on the South African Supreme Court case, State v. Ebrahim, 95 ILR
(1991) pp. 417 at 442, for the proposition that the OTP must come before the Trial Chamber with
'clean hands'. See Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture, supra n. 9, para. 111.
51. See Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture, supra n. 9, para. 96.
52. The findings of the Trial Chamber were somewhat strained in this regard. For a more detailed
discussion, see J. Sloan, 'Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic: decision on defence motion on irregular cap-
ture', 16 LJIL (2003) p. 541.
53. Indeed the Trial Chamber builds upon the concession of the defence that there was no connec-
tion between SFOR or the OPT and the captors, noting that 'from the assumed facts the conclusion
must be drawn that there are no indicia that SFOR or the Prosecution offered any incentives to [the
captors]' [emphasis added], Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture, supra n. 9, para. 101.
54. See ibid., para. 112.
55. 'In a situation where an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe even subjected to inhu-
man, cruel or degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to the Tribunal, this may
constitute a legal impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction over such an accused.' Ibid., para. 114.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
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illegality, either regarding state sovereignty or human rights or due process provi-
sions, it did not have to decide whether illegality would interfere with its jurisdic-
tion.
As noted, the reasoning of the Trial Chamber in Nikolic was dominated by its
reliance on the concession of the accused that there was no connection between the
OTP or SFOR and his capture. Given that the defence expressly reserved its right
to seek 'to establish the facts surrounding his arrest as an alternative challenge to
the Tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction',58 it was clear what was likely to come next.
If these illegal capture proceedings based on the assumed facts failed, Nikolic
could still pursue his case of illegal capture by requesting an evidentiary hearing
whereby he would seek disclosure orders against the OTP and SFOR. Todorovic
provides a clear precedent for this. Of course, such an attempt to find evidence to
link SFOR with Nikolic's capture could potentially be highly embarrassing to
SFOR; moreover, it would likely damage relations between NATO states and the
Tribunal. However, before any such evidentiary hearing was to be requested, the
matter would first go before the Appeals Chamber for final disposition. As we
shall see, the decision by the Appeals Chamber ensured that no such disclosure
would be pursued.
3.2 The Appeals Chamber's decision on the effect of the arrest
In contrast to the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber proceeded on the assump-
tion that a violation of both the sovereignty of Serbia and Montenegro and of Ni-
kolic's human rights had occurred, disregarding the reasoning of the Trial Cham-
ber almost entirely. The Appeals Chamber set out a three-stage approach to the
matter:
1. First it would consider the 'circumstances, if any, [in which] the International
Tribunal should decline to exercise its jurisdiction because an accused has been
brought before it through conduct violating State sovereignty or human
rights'.59
2. Once armed with such a standard, it would then determine whether the facts, if
proven, would warrant such a remedy.
3. If so, it would then 'determine whether the underlying violations are attributable
to SFOR and by extension to the OTP'.60
As we shall see, the Appeals Chamber put forward tests for when jurisdiction
should be denied in the face of an illegal capture. Based on its application of these
tests to the limited facts that were discernable from its decision, the Appeals
58. Ibid., para. 6.
59. Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Con-
cerning Legality of Arrest, Appeals Chamber, 5 June 2003, para. 18 (hereafter, Nikolic Decision on
Illegal Capture at Appeal).
60. Ibid., para. 18.
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Chamber held that the proposed remedy was not warranted. Therefore, it did not
have to consider the third stage of its approach.61
3.2.1 Stage one: when should the ICTY decline jurisdiction based on violation
of state sovereignty or human rights?
On the issue of when it is appropriate to refuse jurisdiction based on a violation of
state sovereignty, the Appeals Chamber acknowledged an 'absence of clarity in the
Statute, Rules and jurisprudence of the International Tribunal'.62 Therefore, the
Appeals Chamber turned to national criminal law to fill the gaps. It is, of course,
perfectly appropriate for the ICTY to turn to national law where there are gaps in
international criminal law - a relatively young part of international law - and it has
done so many times in the past.63 But it must be acknowledged that this gap-filling
process vests in the ICTY judges a tremendous discretion in deciding what na-
tional jurisdictions to consult (it would be impractical to consult the national juris-
diction of each and every state in the world), what the characteristics of national
law in the jurisdictions consulted are and which particular aspects of this national
law are applicable to the ICTY in view of its many differences from a national
system. While this discretion is necessary and desirable, with it must come a duty
on the part of the judges to be balanced and comprehensive (or at least relatively
so) in their analysis of the national law and clear in their reasoning as to why the
law of one national jurisdiction is apposite - and why that of another is not. Un-
fortunately, in the Nikolic decision the Appeals Chamber's treatment of national
case law was flawed; it was neither comprehensive - giving the impression of
selectivity - nor clearly reasoned, at times relying on cases that are either inappo-
site or controversial, and at times failing to cite a source at all.
Despite its acknowledgement that 'it is difficult to identify a clear pattern in [the
national criminal] case law'64 on the question of the exercise of jurisdiction in the
face of an illegal or irregular interstate capture, and that 'caution is needed when
generalising',65 the Appeals Chamber appeared to disregard its own good advice
and proceeded to generalise based on a small number of cases, several of which
were of only limited value to the ICTY. Based on a perfunctory review of
61. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber signalled that even if such a link had existed, it would not
consider the requested remedy to be warranted. See text accompanying n. 146 infra.
62. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 20.
63. As noted by no less an authority than Professor Antonio Cassese, the first President of the
ICTY: 'International criminal law is a relatively new branch of international law' and one which
'more than any other ... simultaneously derives its origins from, and continuously draws upon, both
international human rights law and national criminal law'. A. Cassese, 'International criminal law', in
M. Evans, ed., International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003) pp. 721 at 722-723. Citing
the paucity of international treaty rules, he noted 'international criminal law is largely the result of the
gradual transposition onto the international plane of rules and legal constructs proper to national crim-
inal law or to national trial proceedings'. Ibid., p. 724.
64. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 24
65. Ibid.
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Eichmann,66 Barbie67 and a handful of other cases,68 the Appeals Chamber reduced
the detailed and complex jurisprudence on the subject of irregular capture from the
world's national courts to two principles and a balancing test. Unfortunately,
neither its first principle nor its balancing test appear to have much support in the
national case law referred to by the Appeals Chamber; its second principle does
not appear to comport with earlier jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber.
The first principle that the Appeals Chamber determined should govern its deci-
sion as to when a violation of state sovereignty may require it to set aside its juris-
diction was that, in cases involving allegations of what it styled 'universally con-
demned offences', national courts 'seem to find in the special character of these
offences and, arguably, in their seriousness, a good reason for not setting aside
jurisdiction'.69 While the Appeals Chamber's main source for this principle ap-
pears to be the writings of Professor, now Judge, Rosalyn Higgins,70 the Appeals
Chamber instead referred readers to the decisions in Eichmann and Barbie in sup-
port of the principle. Eichmann is perhaps the most famous case involving the
issue of whether it is appropriate for a court to exercise jurisdiction when faced
with an illegal capture. There the accused, who was head of the Jewish Office of
the German Gestapo and in charge of its policy to exterminate European Jews,
argued that his prosecution in Israel following his abduction from Argentina con-
flicted with international law and exceeded the jurisdiction of the Israeli courts.71
In its decision, the Jerusalem District Court entered into an extremely thorough
analysis of the approaches of various nations to illegal interstate capture at the
time before endorsing the male captus, bene detentus approach. It concluded that
it was 'an established rule of law that a person being tried for an offence against the
laws of a state may not oppose his trial by reason of the illegality of his arrest or
the means whereby he was brought within the jurisdiction of that State'.72 The
District Court's approach was confirmed by the Israeli Supreme Court.73
66. The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann (D.C. Jerusalem, 1961), 36ILR
(1968) p. 18 (hereafter, Eichmann District Court), and (S. Ct. Israel, 1962), 36 ILR (1968) p. 304
(hereafter, Eichmann Supreme Court).
67. Federation nationale des deportes et internes resistants et patriotes et autres c. Barbie (Cass.
crim., 1983), 78 ILR (1988) p. 125 (hereafter, Barbie).
68. In its consideration of sovereignty issues, the Appeals Chamber's analysis of the national law
on illegal interstate capture ran to a mere three paragraphs; in its human rights analysis, it referred to a
single national case.
69. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 24.
70. The Appeals Chamber referred to Judge Higgins' highly regarded discussion of international
law, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1994)
p. 72, only for the proposition that 'universally condemned offences are a matter of concern to the
international community as a whole'. {Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at Appeal, supra n. 59,
para. 25. However, the first principle put forward by the Appeals Chamber bears a striking similarity
to Judge Higgins' thesis that there should be an exception to any prohibition on the exercise of juris-
diction in the face of irregular apprehension where the crime in question was a universally condemned
one.
71. Eichmann District Court, supra n. 66.
72. Ibid., p. 59.
73. Eichmann Supreme Court, supra n. 66.
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While it is true, as the Appeals Chamber pointed out, that the Supreme Court in
Eichmann did emphasise the universal character of the crimes with which Eich-
mann was charged, the court's decision in this regard had little relevance to the
issue that was before the ICTY Appeals Chamber. The Israeli Supreme Court's
emphasis on the nature of the Eichmann's crimes (they were said to have been
'condemned publicly by the civilized world'74) was for the purpose of establishing
Israel's judicial jurisdiction over the accused, not in support of an assertion that the
nature of Eichmann's capture had no bearing on the jurisdiction of the court to try
him.75 For this latter assertion, the District Court relied upon the principle of male
captus, bene detentus which, as noted, it found to be an established rule of law.
The other case offered in support of the Appeals Chambers' first principle was
that of Barbie?6 Here again, while the French court did stress the odious nature of
the crimes with which the accused had been charged, once again the point was
made in support of a quite different issue.77 The court in Barbie was not asserting
that somehow, due to the universally condemned nature of the crimes attributed to
the accused, the French courts would be less troubled by irregular capture or the
violation of state sovereignty.78 Indeed, in Barbie there was no illegal interstate
capture.
74. Ibid., p. 306.
75. The comments regarding the nature of the crimes alleged were made by the Supreme Court in
response to an argument by counsel for the accused that because Eichmann was not alleged to have
committed the crime in the forum state (i.e., Israel), the national case law relied upon by the District
Court in support of the male captus bene detentus principle (which involved irregularly captured in-
dividuals accused of crimes in their forum states, who then fled to the states from which they were
captured, to be ultimately returned to their forum states for trial) was inapposite and the principle was
inapplicable. It was in reply to this argument that the Supreme Court noted the 'international nature' of
Eichmann's crimes and stressed that they were of a type which had 'been condemned publicly by the
civilized world'; because universal jurisdiction provided the necessary judicial jurisdiction, the ques-
tion of whether he committed the crime in the forum state or another state was not relevant and the
argument of the defence failed. The Supreme Court noted that counsel for Eichmann had 'confused
the question of the substantive penal jurisdiction of the State of Israel with the question of whether his
client enjoys immunity from the exercise of that jurisdiction against him by reason of the fact of his
abduction. These two questions are entirely separate from one another'. Eichmann Supreme Court,
supra n. 66, p. 307. The Appeals Chamber appeared to suffer from a similar confusion: counsel for
Nikolic was not arguing, of course, that the ICTY lacked substantive jurisdiction, merely that, in the
circumstances, it should decline jurisdiction in the face of the violations of Nikolic's human rights and
Serbia and Montenegro's sovereignty.
76. Barbie, supra n. 67.
77. In Barbie, the accused, the head of the Gestapo in Lyon during the German occupation of
France, was expelled from Bolivia and deposited in French Guinea (considered by the court to be
French territory). He did not claim to have been captured in violation of Bolivian law, nor did he
claim that the sovereignty of French Guyana had been violated. Instead, he applied for his release on
the grounds that he had been a victim of disguised extradition which invalidated the proceedings
against him. It was in reply to this claim that the Chambre d'accusation and later the Court of Cassa-
tion asserted that there had been no disguised extradition but simply the execution of an arrest warrant
issued by a French judge and carried out on French territory.
78. Counsel for the defence argued that because the crimes in question were not provided for in
French law, they lacked a proper legal basis and the defendant could not be charged with them. Reject-
ing this assertion, the court emphasised the universal nature of the crimes attributed to the accused.
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The second principle the Appeals Chamber derived from the national case law
regarding when a violation of state sovereignty might require it to set aside its
jurisdiction provides that 'it is easier for courts to assert their jurisdiction'79 when
the state whose sovereignty has been violated has not complained of that fact.80
This principle appears to have its foundation in the District Court's determination
in Eichmann81 that the defendant lacked locus standi to argue that Argentina's sov-
ereignty had been violated; the right to raise this issue lay exclusively with the
state.82 What the Appeals Chamber failed to mention, however, is that the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY (differently constituted) had previously considered and em-
phatically rejected the Eichmann court's approach to who was entitled to raise a
violation of state sovereignty. In the words of the Appeals Chamber in Tadic:
'Dating back to a period when sovereignty stood as a sacrosanct and unassailable attri-
bute of statehood, this concept [i.e. that the right to raise the issue of breach of sover-
eignty lay exclusively with the state] recently has suffered progressive erosion at the
hands of the more liberal forces at work in the democratic societies, particularly in the
field of human rights. ...
Whatever the situation in domestic litigation, the traditional doctrine upheld and acted
upon by the Trial Chamber is not reconcilable, in this International Tribunal, with the
view that an accused, being entitled to a full defence, cannot be deprived of a plea so
intimately connected with, and grounded in, international law as a defence based on
violation of State sovereignty. To bar an accused from raising such a plea is tantamount
to deciding that, in this day and age, an international court could not, in a criminal
matter where the liberty of an accused is at stake, examine a plea raising the issue of
violation of State sovereignty. Such a startling conclusion would imply a contradiction
in terms which this Chamber feels it is its duty to refute and lay to rest.'
This is, of course, quite different than asserting the principle that where crimes are particularly odious
jurisdiction should not be set aside in the face of an illegal or irregular capture.
79. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 24.
80. Ibid.
81. Eichmann District Court, supra n. 66. Two other national cases, decided after Eichmann, were
also referred to in this regard: Re Argoud (Cass. crim., 1964), 45 ILR (1972) pp. 90 at 97; and Stocke v.
the Federal Republic of Germany (BVerfGE, 1985), EuGRZ (1986) p. 18, and (BGH, 1984), NStZ
(1984) p. 563.
82. In the words of the District Court: 'The right to plead violation of the sovereignty of a State is
the exclusive right of that State. Only a sovereign State may raise the plea or waive it, and the accused
has no right to take over the rights of that State,' Eichmann District Court, supra n. 66, para. 62.
83. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October
1995, para. 55 (hereafter, Tadic Appeal on Jurisdiction). A Trial Chamber of the ICTY, which first
considered the issue in the Tadic case, held that the accused lacked 'the locus standi to raise the issue
of primacy, which involves a plea that the sovereignty of a State has been violated, a plea only a
sovereign State may raise or waive and a right clearly the accused cannot take over from that State'.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1-T, Decision on Jurisdiction, Trial Chamber, 10 August 1995, para.
41. In this regard, it relied on Eichmann District Court and, in particular, its passage at para. 62,
reproduced supra n. 82. As is evident from the above passage from Tadic Appeal Jurisdiction, this
approach was unequivocally overruled by the Appeals Chamber. This right of an accused to assert the
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Moreover, the Appeals Chamber's assertion that Serbia and Montenegro had 'not
lodged any compliant and thus has acquiesced in the [ICTY's] exercise of juris-
diction'84 appears somewhat disingenuous: it ignores the fact that there is no estab-
lished procedure for the lodging of a complaint of violation of sovereignty with the
ICTYor any other body.85
The Appeals Chamber then offered a balancing test to be applied in making a
determination as to when a violation of state sovereignty might require it to set
aside jurisdiction. It weighed the 'legitimate expectation [of the international com-
munity as a whole] that those accused of [universally condemned offences] will be
brought to justice swiftly'86 'against the principle of state sovereignty and the fun-
damental human rights of the accused'.87 This test is entirely unattributed.88 Noth-
ing in the cases referred to offers a similar test; however, the Appeals Chamber
may have been influenced by a 1999 British court decision (to which it did not
refer) propagating a similar test.89 This test was also advocated by a member of the
OTP staff in a published article on illegal capture.90
It may be understandable that the Appeals Chamber was not overly concerned
about a comparatively minor violation of the sovereignty of Serbia and Montene-
gro91 in view of that state's breach of its international responsibility to hand over
breach of a state's sovereignty regardless of the state's wishes in the matter is also discussed in the
Dokmanovic case, supra n. 17, para. 76.
84. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 26.
85. Unlike the Eichmann case, where the matter was raised at the Security Council, this violation of
sovereignty did not feature (so far as we can tell) one Member State entering into the territory of
another. Arguably, the fact that Serbia and Montenegro brought criminal proceedings against the in-
dividuals who carried out the capture indicated that it was rather less untroubled by the abduction than
the Appeals Chamber suggests.
86. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 25.
87. Ibid., para. 26.
88. This is of an entirely different nature than the 'balancing exercise' called for by the Trial Cham-
ber whereby it would 'assess all the factors of relevance' in order to conclude whether it can exercise
jurisdiction over the accused. The factors considered by the Trial Chamber were the severity of the
mistreatment of the accused and whether the OTP or SFOR had been involved. See text accompany-
ing nn. 50-52 supra.
89. See R. v. Mullen, in The Times, 15 February 1999. This case involved IRA terrorism, where a
test which is very similar to the one propounded by the Appeals Chamber is relied upon. There the
court held that it:
'recognises the immense degree of public revulsion which has, quite properly, attached to the activ-
ities of those who have assisted and furthered the violent operations of the IRA and other terrorist
organisations. In the discretionary exercise, great weight must therefore be attached to the nature of
the offence involved in this case ... . [TJhere may... be ... cases in which the seriousness of the crime
is so great relative to the nature of the abuse of process that it would be a proper exercise of judicial
discretion to permit a prosecution to proceed ... notwithstanding an abuse of process.'
90. See Lamb, supra n. 16, p. 240. She suggested (relying on the Mullen case) that the 'Tribunal
may in future be required to strike a similar balance between, on the one hand, considerations of due
process and the individual rights of the accused and, on the other, the dictates of the most elementary
justice which require that such crimes be subject to prosecution and punishment'.
91. The Appeals Chamber noted simply that the damage to international justice by not apprehend-
ing fugitives accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law was greater 'than the
injury, if any, caused to the sovereignty of a State by a limited intrusion in its territory, particularly
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the accused.92 But to simply observe that the violation may lead to 'consequences
for the international responsibility of the State or organization involved',93 without
establishing meaningful parameters regarding when such violations will be toler-
ated by the ICTY, gives a blank cheque to those who would violate state sovereign-
ty in what they perceive to be the best interests of international criminal justice. If
this were to be considered a precedent for capture of those indicted by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) residing in non-cooperating member states, the ramifi-
cations could be very damaging to international peace and security.94
The Appeals Chamber's treatment of the question of when it would be appropri-
ate for it to decline jurisdiction based on human rights concerns was briefer still. It
again relied on its unattributed balancing test, adding that the 'correct balance must
... be maintained between the fundamental rights of the accused and the essential
interests of the international community in the prosecution of persons charged with
serious violations of international humanitarian law'.95 Although it accepted that
Nikolic's 'fundamental'96 human rights had been breached, it did not elaborate
what rights of the accused had been violated.97 Moreover, despite noting that 'cer-
tain human rights violations are of such a serious nature that they require the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction be declined',98 it did not offer any indication of when such a
level of seriousness would be reached, commenting only that such a remedy will
'usually be disproportionate'.99 In support of its approach, the Appeals Chamber
cited a single case from national courts, the US case of Toscanino,100 as well as a
single case from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).101 So
perfunctory was Appeals Chamber's handling of this important issue that the de-
fendant was compelled to take the extraordinary step of petitioning the Appeals
Chamber for clarification as to 'exactly what test is contemplated' in determining
when the intrusion occurs in default of the State's cooperation'. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at
Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 26.
92. See supra nn. 9-13.
93. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 26.
94. Of course, unlike the ICTY, the Statute of the ICC was not established as a means to restore
peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter, with the attendant obligations on states to carry
out the decision of the Security Council. Nevertheless, refusal by a member state of the ICC to surren-
der an accused would amount to a breach of international responsibility as well.
95. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 30.
96. Ibid., para. 26.
97. The only hint in this regard comes from its brief reference to US v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d
Cir. 1974), where the accused alleged that he had been brought into the US illegally and had been the
victim of brutal and prolonged torture with the participation of US law enforcement officials. 'The
Appeals Chamber relied on the US court's reference to "due process" and the invasion of the accu-
sed's constitutional rights' in the context of the US system. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at
Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 29.
98. Ibid., para. 30.
99. Ibid.
100. US v. Toscanino, supra, n. 97.
101. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, Appeals Chamber, 3 No-
vember 1999, para. 74 (hereafter Barayagwiza /). The Appeals Chamber held that a court may decline
to exercise jurisdiction if doing so 'in light of serious and egregious violations of the accused's rights
would prove detrimental to the court's integrity'.
334 J. Sloan
whether a human rights violation is serious.102 The Appeals Chamber, however,
refused to be drawn: it not only rejected the motion, but declared it frivolous,
noting that its statements 'require no clarification'.103
The Appeal Chamber's focus on the serious nature of the crimes and the indig-
nation of the international community, and its willingness to balance it against
violations of human rights or sovereignty (and, in the case of sovereignty, to find a
good basis for not setting aside jurisdiction in the 'universally condemned' nature
of the alleged offences) leaves the impression that the graver the alleged crime, the
less troubled an international judicial body should be by the violation. On the
question of human rights, at least, such an approach must surely be misguided: it
does not appear to comport with the presumption of innocence. Indeed, if our
human rights are to be meaningful, the opposite approach would appear fitting.
That is to say, when an accused is charged with a very serious crime - one of the
type that is likely to engender severe public outrage, or in the words of the Appeals
Chamber one that triggers the 'legitimate expectation' of 'the international com-
munity' - a judicial body must be most scrupulous in ensuring that the accused's
human rights are observed. For a court to provide no remedy for a human rights
violation where the accused is charged with a traffic offence and subject to a fine
would be regrettable; to provide no remedy where the accused is charged with
mass murder or war crimes and subject to life imprisonment would be unconscion-
able. Equally troublingly, the Appeal Chamber's decision to make 'the essential
interests of the international community in the prosecution of persons charged
with serious violations of international humanitarian law' an essential element in
its balancing test for the application of human rights guarantees results in the Ap-
peals Chamber affording itself pure, unmitigated discretion.
The Appeals Chamber offered little guidance as to why it favoured the male
captus, bene detentus approach over the male captus, male detentus approach. It
did not discuss - or even acknowledge - the trend in many state courts in recent
years away from the male captus, bene detentus approach. While a handful of na-
tional decisions favouring the male captus, male detentus approach are briefly
touched upon in a single paragraph of the decision, there is almost no considera-
tion of why those state courts felt compelled to reject jurisdiction. Among the rea-
sons offered by the national courts of such states are a desire to safeguard the rule
of law,104 a desire to discourage violations of state sovereignty,105 a reluctance to
102. Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, Decision on Motion Requesting Clarification,
Appeals Chamber, 6 August 2003, p. 2 (hereafter, Decision on Motion Requesting Clarification).
103. Ibid.
104. See, for example, R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates Court, Ex parte Bennett, (1994) 98 Cr.
App. R 114 (HL). Lord Bridge of Harwich noted at p. 130 that there is 'no principle more basic to any
proper system of law than the maintenance of the rule of law itself. When it is shown that the law
enforcement agency responsible for bringing a prosecution has only been enabled to do so by partici-
pation in violations of international law and of the laws of another state in order to secure the presence
of the accused within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, I think that respect for the rule of law
demands that the court take cognisance of that circumstance.'
105. See, for example, State v. Ebrahim, supra n. 50, p. 442, where the court noted that 'interna-
tional legal sovereignty must be respected'; see also State v. Beahan, 1992 (1) SACR 307 (A) p. 317,
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see the administration of justice dependent on illegal conduct (and to avoid the
disrepute that will follow),106 a desire to avoid unfairness to the accused,107 and a
recognition of the need to rein in an overzealous executive branch.108 All are legit-
imate concerns for an international judicial body such as the ICTY; however, none
of these concerns are discussed by the Appeals Chamber.109
Where a body charged with applying international criminal law considers it nec-
essary to draw upon national law to fill gaps, an essential aspect of its task must be
to analyse the national case law, considering not just its relevance to the ICTY
(given the difference in the nature of the obligations of nations from those of the
ICTY), but also how it was received nationally and, where applicable, internation-
ally. Here, the Appeals Chamber does not do so. For example, the Appeals Cham-
ber relied on the US case of Alvarez-Machainu0 without criticism or qualification.
It did not consider how (or whether) the case of Toscanino comported with the
approach of the Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain,111 which, of course, was
decided at a higher level. The Appeals Chamber gave no indication that the Unites
States Supreme Court had been thoroughly pilloried both in the United States and
where the court noted that illegal interstate capture 'corrodes the peaceful coexistence and mutual
respect of sovereign nations'.
106. See State v. Beahan, supra n. 105. The court held that 'in order to promote confidence in and
respect for the administration of justice and preserve the judicial process from contamination, a court
should decline to compel an accused person to undergo trial in circumstances where his appearance
before it has been facilitated by an act of abduction undertaken by the prosecuting State'. See also R. v.
Horseferry Road Magistrates Court, Ex parte Bennett, supra n. 104, p. 135 per Lord Lowry, where
the court stayed the prosecution 'because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be
asked to try the accused in ... circumstances [involving illegal interstate capture]'.
107. See State v. Ebrahim, supra n. 50, p. 442, where the court noted that 'the legal process must
be fair towards those affected by it'.
108. See also R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates Court, Ex parte Bennett, supra n. 104, p. 130 per
Lord Bridge of Harwich, where the court noted that 'To hold that the court may turn a blind eye to
executive lawlessness beyond the frontiers of its own jurisdiction is, to my mind, an insular and un-
acceptable view.'
109. While it is, of course, the case that its jurisdiction, method of establishment (under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter) and relationship with UN Member States distinguish the ICTY from national
courts, the concerns of national courts would, at least prime facie, appear to be applicable to the ICTY.
Indeed, similar concerns were voiced by the Appeals Chamber of the 1CTR in Barayagwiza I, supra n.
101, para. 108, where the accused was ordered released as a result of violations of his human rights.
The Appeals Chamber observed: 'As troubling as this disposition may be to some, the Appeals Cham-
ber believes that to proceed with the Appellant's trial when such violations have been committed,
would cause irreparable damage to the integrity of the judicial process. Moreover, we find that it is
the only effective remedy for the cumulative breaches of the accused's rights. Finally, this disposition
may very well deter the commission of such serious violations in the future.'
110. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US655 (\992).
111. S. Wilske and T. Schiller, 'Jurisdiction over persons abducted in violation of international law
in the aftermath of United States v. Alvarez-Machain', 5 Univ. of Chicago Law School Roundtable
(1998) pp. 205 at 208. The authors consider the Toscanino case to present an exception to the general
rule regarding jurisdiction in the United States, which 'hinges upon the application of the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine, which states that, as a matter of principle, a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction is not
defeated by a defendant's unlawful importation in to the court's jurisdictions'.
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internationally for its decision in this case."2 Indeed, such was the level of indig-
nation at the approach of the US Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain that there was
an international effort to have the General Assembly request an advisory opinion
on the matter from the International Court of Justice."3 Similarly, the adverse reac-
tion of the international community to the abduction of Eichmann is not acknowl-
edged by the Appeals Chamber."4
Nor did the decision of the Appeals Chamber consider the particular circum-
stances of the national jurisprudence and how these circumstances may impact on
the relevance to the ICTY of a national decision. For example, the decision relied
heavily on the Eichmann case without giving any indication that the Appeals
Chamber was aware that the legal analysis engaged in by the District Court in
1961 (and which formed the basis of its findings on male captus, bene detentus)
was outdated - so much so that its reasoning on illegal interstate capture can no
longer be said to be sound in certain respects."5 Likewise, the Appeals Chamber
did not consider that the majority of the US Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain
implied it was not concerned with international law, so long as US constitutional
law was not breached.116
112. See, for example, C. Biblowit, Transborder abductions and United States policy: comments
on United States v. Alvarez Machain', 9 NY Int'l L. Rev. (1996) pp. 105 at 107, where he observed
'Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, described the decision as "monstrous"'. The New York
Times found the majority's opinion 'astonishing'. The Inter-American Juridical Committee of the
OAS criticised the decision; Mexico, and many other countries protested. Rarely has a decision of the
Supreme Court on an issue of international law created as great a furor.' See also Wilske and Schiller,
ibid., pp. 205-213. See also M. Scharf, 'The tools for enforcing international criminal justice in the
new millennium: lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal', 49 DePaul Law Review (2000) pp. 925 at
969, where he outlines the adverse international reaction to the decision.
113. See Scharf, supra n. 112, p. 969.
114. This included a resolution by the Security Council of 23 June 1960, UN Doc. S/4349. The
resolution stated that the 'reciprocal respect for and the mutual protection of the sovereign rights of
States [were] an essential condition for their harmonious coexistence', and 'that the repetition of acts
[such as the capture of Eichmann] would involve a breach of the principles upon which international
order is founded, creating an atmosphere of insecurity and distrust incompatible with the preservation
of peace'. Moreover, the resolution declared that 'acts ... which affect the sovereignty of a Member
State and therefore cause international friction, may if repeated, endanger international peace and
security'.
115. The District Court's observation at p. 66 that it was only aware of one case conflicting with
the male captus bene detentus precedent could not be made today. Eichmann District Court, supra n.
66. For example, the District Court relied on the case of Ex Parte Elliot [1949] 1 All ER 373 as
showing that '[fjhe courts in England ... have constantly held that the circumstances of the arrest and
the mode of bringing the accused into the territory of the State have no relevance to his trial, and they
have consistently refused in all instances to enter upon an examination of these circumstances.' Ibid.,
p. 59. However, as noted more recently by one British expert: 'There were a number of inconsistent
decisions on this point [that there could be a legitimate exercise of jurisdiction despite an illegal
abduction] after the Elliott case, but the law has now to an extent been clarified by R v. Horseferry
Road Magistrates Court, Exparte Bennett, which reaches the opposite conclusion to that in the Elliott
case.' D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th edn. (London, Sweet and Maxwell
1998) p. 293.
116. The court observed that counsel for the accused 'may be correct that respondent's abduction
was "shocking" ... and that it may be in violation of general principles of international law ...' but the
court found, nonetheless, that his 'forcible abduction did not prohibit his trial in a court in the United
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What's more, the decision of the Appeals Chamber made no effort to distinguish
the obligations of the ICTY from those of the states, the jurisprudence of whose
courts it relied upon. While the exact scope of the ICTY's obligations to abide by
international human rights law standards may be the subject of some debate,117 it is
clear from previous jurisprudence of the ICTY,118 as well as from the human rights
provisions in its Statute,119 that the internationally recognised standards most rele-
vant to its work come from the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights of 1966 (ICCPR).120 This may not be said of the Eichmann or Alvarez-Ma-
chain cases, both of which were decided in states that were not parties to the
ICCPR at the time. Indeed, in regard to the latter case, a UN body made a determi-
nation that a breach of Article 9 of the ICCPR had taken place.121 The Appeals
Chamber made no effort to reconcile the approach in the Toscanino case with the
jurisprudence of other states which did not require an egregious element to the
violation of human rights of an accused in order for the court to reject jurisdic-
tion.122 Perhaps most troubling, the Appeals Chamber failed to consider whether
its approach to the accused's human rights violations was reconcilable with the
provisions of the ICCPR or the European Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms123 - which, at least arguably, go against the
Appeals Chamber's reasoning.124
Of course, this is not the first time the ICTY has had to balance human rights
concerns with those of the administration of international criminal justice. Its most
notorious case in this regard involved Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, accused of plan-
ning and inciting the genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda. In an initial deci-
States for violations of the criminal laws of the United States'. United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
supra n. 110, pp. 669-670. Judge Higgins, supra n. 70, noted at p. 71 that the 'Supreme Court was
discussing whether the abduction violated the treaty, not the underlying issue of whether jurisdiction
should be exercised if the abduction violated international law generally or a specific treaty'.
117. On the question of the extent to which the ICTY is bound by international human rights law,
see G. Sluiter, 'International criminal proceedings and the protection of human rights', 37 New Eng-
land Law Review (2003) p. 935.
118. Perhaps most famously, the passage from the first decision of the Appeals Chamber in Tadic
Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra n. 83, para. 45: 'For a tribunal such as this one to be established accord-
ing to the rule of law, it must be established in accordance with the proper international standards; it
must provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full conformity with inter-
nationally recognised human rights instruments.'
119. See, e.g., Art. 21 of the Statute. Also, as noted in the Secretary-General's Report, supra n. 8,
para. 106: 'It is axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect internationally recognized
standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its proceedings.'
120. Entered into force 23 March 1976. Indeed, Art. 21 of the Statute is an almost verbatim trans-
position of Art. 9 ICCPR.
121. See Scharf, supra n. 112, p. 969 where he notes that the UN Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention specifically condemned the detention of Alvarez-Machain as being in violation of Art. 9
ICCPR.
122. See, for example, R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates Court, Ex pane Bennett, supra n. 104.
123. Entered into force on 3 September 1953.
124. As noted by Higgins, supra n. 70, p. 70: 'From the perspective of an individual, his forcible
detention and removal (whether or not from one jurisdiction to another, whether or not to stand trial)
violate his human rights, in that everyone is entitled to security of the person and only to be restrained
in accordance with due process. This is provided for in all the leading instruments on human rights?'
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sion,125 the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR ordered his release and the stay of his
prosecution based on a determination that there had been abuse of process in his
case.126 After a political furore that included threats by Rwanda to withdraw its
cooperation with the ICTR,127 the matter again went before the Appeals Cham-
ber.128 This second hearing resulted in a revision of the original decision based on
the introduction of new facts (facts described by one expert as 'rather dubious'129),
with the result that the order for Barayagwiza's release was quashed.130 This judi-
cial flip-flop was viewed by many as politically motivated. Of course, with this
decision in the Nikolic case, the Appeals Chamber avoided the risk of having to
suffer the embarrassment of reversing itself in the face of political pressure.
In sum, the analysis of the Appeals Chamber regarding the impact on its juris-
diction of the violation of sovereignty and of human rights is inadequate. It leaves
the impression of selectivity. Of course, an Appeals Chamber is not in a position to
consult every jurisdiction in the world before filling the gaps that exist in interna-
tional criminal law. But a more thoroughgoing approach is called for, particularly
as regards such an important and controversial issue. Moreover, because the Ap-
peals Chamber was unwilling to engage in a detailed discussion of how severe the
violation of state sovereignty or the accused's human rights must be before the
proposed remedy would be appropriate, its tests are of only limited utility for the
future. As we see immediately below, its tests are even less helpful as the facts
surrounding Nikolic's capture have never been clearly established.
3.2.2 Stage two: do the facts in the case, when applied to the Appeals
Chamber s test at stage one, justify the remedy sought?
The next task the Appeals Chamber set itself was to take its newly minted tests for
when it should reject jurisdiction and apply them to the facts. However, the Ap-
peals Chamber attempted to do this without getting to the heart of what really
happened on the night of Nikolic's capture - including what might motivate a
group of private citizens to abduct the accused and turn him over to SFOR.131
Instead, it relied on the incomplete record before the Trial Chamber and an opaque
process whereby it engaged in a factual review on its own initiative.
125. Barayagwiza I, supra n. 101.
126. The abuse of process consisted of an overly long provisional detention, violation of his right
to be promptly charged and violation of his right to an initial appearance without delay.
127. W. Schabas, 'Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor in international decisions', 94 AJIL (2000) pp. 563 at
565.
128. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, Appeals Chamber, 31
March 2000 (hereafter, Barayagwiza II).
129. Schabas, supra n. 127, p. 566.
130. Barayagwiza was subsequently sentenced to 35 years (less time served) for genocide and
crimes against humanity, Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan
Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, Trial Chamber, 3 December 2003.
131. According to one news report, the accused's captors were bounty hunters, paid £31,000 to
hand the accused over to a US-led contingent of SFOR. See Cvijanovic and Zimonjic, supra n. 35,
p. 14. The report indicates that the police said that the payment came from 'unspecified "foreign
services'".
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The Appeals Chamber had before it the very limited facts agreed to for the pur-
poses of the motions before the Trial Chamber. According to these agreed facts, on
or about 20 April 2000, Nikolic was taken forcibly and against his will from his
home in Serbia and Montenegro by a group of private individuals acting in contra-
vention of the national criminal law. Again, according to the agreed facts, the ac-
cused was handcuffed, placed in the trunk of a car and transported into the territory
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.132 As noted, counsel for Nikolic was willing to con-
cede for the purposes of the motion that neither SFOR nor the OTP had any con-
nection to the abduction. The Trial Chamber did not pronounce on the accuracy of
these agreed facts.133 Instead, the Trial Chamber limited its findings on the facts to
a determination that Nikolic was arrested by SFOR on or about 20 April 2000 and
transferred to the ICTYon or about 21 April 2000,'34 noting, moreover, that 'both
parties agree that a trial of the alleged abductors has taken place in Serbia and that
those persons have been convicted of the offence'.135 By its own admission, the
Trial Chamber was unclear as to what really went on that night.136
Nor were the parties much clearer on the details of what actually happened on
the night of Nikolic's capture. While Nikolic, of course, was aware of the details he
personally witnessed, it appears he was in the dark about all other aspects of the
capture. Indeed, in his motions before the Trial Chamber, he felt it necessary to
reserve the right to request an evidentiary hearing 'to establish the facts surround-
ing his arrest'.137 The OTP, for its part, claimed that it had no information relating
to Nikolic's capture other than what it had provided to him.138
The facts to which the Appeals Chamber applied its tests appeared very limited
indeed, and would appear to be based entirely on the facts agreed to for the pur-
poses of the proceedings at trial. One other potential source of information that
existed for the Appeals Chamber was a proprio motu review it had engaged in.
After faulting Nikolic for not presenting it with 'any alternative or more compre-
hensive view of the facts that might show that the Trial Chamber erred',139 the
132. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture, supra n. 9, para. 21.
133. Although the Appeals Chamber appears to consider it to have done so. See Nikolic Decision
on Illegal Capture at Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 2, where the Appeals Chamber held that 'the Trial
Chamber found that ... "neither SFOR nor the Prosecution were involved in'" Nikolic's allegedly
illegal arrest and abduction, however, the Trial Chamber did not make such a finding per se; rather it
reached that conclusion '[b]ased on the assumed facts'. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture, supra n.
9, unnumbered final para., entitled 'Conclusions'.
134. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 2. See also Nikolic Decision
on Illegal Capture, supra n. 9, para. 15.
135. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture, supra n. 9, para. 6.
136. Ibid., para. 15.
137. See text accompanying n. 58 supra.
138. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture, supra n. 9, para. 6.
139. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 31. It does not suggest how
Nikolic could have conceivably come up with a more comprehensive view of the facts without an
order for disclosure from the Tribunal, something which defence counsel had obligingly agreed not to
request until the motions under appeal were decided.
340 J. Sloan
Appeals Chamber's indicated that, 'in fairness to the Accused',140 it had engaged in
aproprio motu review of 'all the facts of this case'.141 The Appeals Chamber did
not indicate whether this proprio motu review involved the issuance of subpoenas
or orders for the attendance of additional witnesses, as is arguably permitted under
the Rules.142 Nor does the decision of the Appeals Chamber shed even a glimmer
of light on what its proprio motu review might have turned up. This led to counsel
for the defence feeling compelled to petition the Appeals Chamber, requesting in-
formation on what the Appeals Chamber may have learned.143 The Appeals Cham-
ber dismissed the defence motion in this regard remarking, with apparent exaspera-
tion, that just because it was bound to give a reasoned opinion did not mean it was
required 'to spell out every step in its reasoning'.144
Based on the incomplete facts available to the Trial Chamber, possibly modified
by its proprio motu review - though the fact that there is no indication that the
Appeals Chamber sought or obtained any additional information suggests that its
review was simply a reconsideration of the incomplete information before the Trial
Chamber - the Appeals Chamber concluded that 'the procedure adopted for [Niko-
lic's] arrest did not disable the Trial Chamber from exercising its jurisdiction'.145
Having arrived at this determination, the third stage of the procedure the Appeals
Chamber set out - that of making a determination as to whether the underlying
violations were attributable to SFOR and by extension to the OTP - became moot.
Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber felt it appropriate to opine on this point, ob-
serving that:
'even assuming the conduct of the Accused's captors should be attributed to SFOR and
that the latter is responsible for a violation of Serbia and Montenegro's sovereignty [or
for a breach of the rights of the accused] the Appeals Chamber finds no basis upon
which the jurisdiction should not be exercised'.146
By acting as it did, the Appeals Chamber decided the motion without having to
reveal to the defendant or the public at large details of what really happened - or
whether SFOR and the OTP had any link to it.
Because the Appeals Chamber showed itself to be generally unmoved by the
violations of state sovereignty or human rights (when measured against the essen-
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
142. Rule 98 provides that a Trial Chamber may order either party to produce additional evidence
and may proprio motu summon witnesses and order their attendance. Such actions would appear to be
authorised at the level of the Appeals Chamber when these rules are read in conjunction with Rule
107, which provides: 'The rules of procedure and evidence that govern proceedings in the Trial Cham-
bers shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings in the Appeals Chamber.'
143. Decision on Motion Requesting Clarification, supra n. 102, p. 2. The defendant petitioned to
discover, inter alia, what the Appeals Chamber determined happened on the evening of Nikolic's
capture.
144. Ibid.
145. Nikolic Decision on Illegal Capture at Appeal, supra n. 59, para. 32.
146. Ibid., paras. 27 and 33.
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tial interests of the international community), because it was willing to state that
there was no basis on which it would deny jurisdiction whether or not the illegal
conduct could be attributed to SFOR, and because it purported to have engaged in
aproprio motu review of all of the facts (though it was unwilling to reveal what, if
anything, its review had determined), it effectively foreclosed Nikolic from re-
questing an evidentiary hearing in order to obtain further disclosure.147 There was
no longer any point.148 As such, with its decision the Appeals Chamber spared
SFOR the possibility of any embarrassing Todorovic-style disclosure regarding
any role it may have had in the violation of the rights of the accused. Moreover,
the decision avoided the embarrassing spectre of the Appeals Chamber issuing an
order requiring the disclosure of information from SFOR officials or their NATO
bosses regarding the level or nature of their participation - only to see the order
ignored by both organisations, as it almost certainly would have been.
4. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we see three different chambers of the ICTY dealing with similar
issues in radically different ways. The Trial Chamber in Todorovic showed itself to
be the most principled of the three. It rejected the unconvincing argument from
SFOR and the OTP to the effect that a disclosure order was unnecessary because
the remedy requested was not suitable in the factual situation (even assuming that
an illegal capture had taken place). While this reasoning would have provided it
with an 'easy out', avoiding a negative impact on the continued cooperation of
SFOR with the ICTY, the Trial Chamber was unwilling to accept it. Todorovic had
a legitimate right to all the information necessary to make out his case based on
illegal capture. Because a plea agreement was reached after the disclosure was
ordered, it remains to be seen what remedy this Chamber would have ordered had
the disclosure revealed that SFOR had had a hand in the illegal capture.
Next came the approach of the Trial Chamber in Nikolic. Here, although the
facts - limited though they were - clearly implied that illegality had occurred, the
Trial Chamber concocted several arguments to the effect that there had been no
breach of sovereignty or human rights and therefore no illegal capture. By making
such improbable findings - the dubiousness of its reasoning was confirmed by the
fact that the Appeals Chamber appeared to find no merit in it, operating, as it did,
on the assumption that violations of human rights and sovereignty had indeed
taken place - the Trial Chamber was able to sidestep the difficult issue of what
remedy would be required. Furthermore, it was able to avoid opening the door to
the process of examining the severity of the violations, thereby ensuring that
147. Notwithstanding the fact that he expressly reserved his right to bring such a hearing. See text
accompanying n. 58 supra.
148. On 4 September 2003 a plea agreement was approved by the Trial Chamber and on 12 De-
cember 2003 Nikolic was sentenced to 23 years' imprisonment (less time served), Prosecutor v.
Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgement, Trial Chamber, 18 December 2003. An
appeal is currently pending.
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SFOR would not be subject to an embarrassing disclosure process, potentially ex-
posing some less than salubrious operational practices. While the Trial Chamber's
approach had its obvious flaws, it may have considered there to be little alterna-
tive. After all, on the one hand it would obviously be reluctant to order the release
of an accused war criminal. On the other hand, it could hardly find that there had
been violations of human rights and sovereignty, assume the conduct should be
attributed to SFOR (and perhaps, by implication, the OTP) and yet rule that Niko-
lic was entitled to no relief. Such an approach would require it to simply ignore the
developing body of national law moving away from the male captus, bene deten-
tus principle. This latter approach, as we have seen, was exactly that taken by the
Appeals Chamber.
Next to consider the issue of illegal capture was the Appeals Chamber in Niko-
lic. It would seem right that observers of the ICTY would look to this, the ICTY's
most authoritative Chamber, for a well-reasoned decision: one which was compre-
hensive in its scope, addressed difficult issues head on and provided a workable
precedent for future cases. Moreover, the defendant himself was entitled to a deci-
sion that would explain why his motions were unsuccessful, as well as providing
him with an understanding of what really occurred on the night of his capture and
who was behind it. Unfortunately, the Appeals Chamber did not feel compelled to
provide such a decision. As discussed above, the decision of the Appeals Chamber
was perfunctory, opaque and not persuasively reasoned. The Appeal Chamber's
concern for human rights and the violation of state sovereignty was half-hearted at
best, with its focus on what it perceived to be the greater good.
The first obligation of a decision-making body in these circumstances should be
to get to the heart of what actually happened, including whether SFOR - charac-
terised by the ICTY as being akin to its enforcement arm149 - played a role in any
illegal activities. While it may be true that SFOR had shown itself to be a stalwart
friend of the ICTY, a judicial body may not maintain credibility and, at the same
time, appear to be protecting a friend from embarrassing disclosure. If, as in the
Todorovic case, a disclosure order had been made against SFOR, then whether the
prosecution could proceed would effectively lie with SFOR: if it violated the Tri-
bunal's order and refused to provide disclosure, a prosecution would be unlikely to
go ahead. If the full facts were set out and it became clear that there was no link to
SFOR, then many of the bases on which national courts have favoured the male
captus, male detentus approach (e.g., a desire to control an overzealous executive,
avoiding the perception of impropriety, etc.) would be mitigated or would become
inapplicable.
If all the facts were brought to light and it became clear that SFOR had been
involved in illegal behaviour, the nature of the violation of human rights and sov-
ereignty would appear in a different light. Indeed, it is not beyond the realm of
possibility that a thorough examination of the facts might even have shown fore-
149. Separate opinion of Judge Robinson, in Todorovic Decision on the Motion for Judicial Assis-
tance, supra n. 22, para. 6 and n. 2, where he likens the role of SFOR 'to that of a police force in some
domestic legal systems', and notes that 'it virtually operates as an enforcement arm of the Tribunal...'.
The reliance by the ICTYon illegal capture 343
knowledge on the part of the OTP of SFOR's intention to carry out illegal capture
operations - something that had been alleged in the Todorovic case. Were such
findings to have been made, the arrest process would have been found to be con-
taminated. The obligation of the Appeals Chamber, therefore, would have been to
provide a remedy that reflected the ICTY's intolerance of such conduct by making
it clear that such behaviour in the future would be unlikely to lead to the prosecu-
tion of the accused. This might very well have taken the form of ordering the
release of Nikolic; at the very least it would have required a clear indication of
when such a remedy would be ordered. For an Appeals Chamber to order the re-
lease of an accused war criminal would take courage, but, depending on the cir-
cumstances (including who was involved, on whose behalf and what level of force
was used), it could well be the only appropriate way forward. While there would
certainly be political fallout in the face of a decision to order the release of an
accused war criminal - many would view this as a retrograde movement in the
battle against impunity - the impartial administration of justice must be the pri-
mary concern of a judicial body, not political factors.
None of which is to say that there may not be strong arguments for taking a
different approach to illegal capture at the international level from those taken at
the national level. A careful analysis of the national cases on illegal capture
(which, as noted, tend to lean away from the male captus, bene detentus approach)
may reveal a legitimate basis on which it would be inappropriate to apply them in a
case such as Nikolic. However, the Appeals Chamber did not engage in such an
analysis.
At the core of the Appeal Chamber's reasoning - and its decision to disregard
the male captus, male detentus approach - was its focus on the severity of the
offence charged and the expectation of the international community of justice. It
would seem axiomatic that the severity of the violation of a state's sovereignty or
an accused's human rights would impact on the nature of the remedy: a territorial
incursion lasting some few minutes would require less of a remedy than an inva-
sion lasting years; similarly, someone whose right to a speedy trial has been brea-
ched by a few days' delay would be entitled to a lesser remedy than someone
whose right to a speedy trial has been breached by a delay of several years. How-
ever, the Appeal Chamber's focus was not a consideration of whether an appropri-
ate remedy might be based on the gravity of the violations — to do so in a thorough
way would have required it to arrive at a finding of what actually happened and
how significant (and perhaps how premeditated) the violations of FRY's sover-
eignty and Nikolic's rights were. Instead, the Appeals Chamber considered what
remedy was appropriate based, in part at least, on the gravity of the crimes with
which the accused was charged. Such an approach provides, in effect, that the
graver the alleged crime, the less troubled an international judicial body should be
by a breach of a state's sovereignty or an accused's human rights. Such is mis-
guided and appears to contradict the presumption of innocence.
In summary, the Appeals Chamber's decision in the Nikolic case appears to pro-
vide an illustration of the adage that 'hard cases make bad law'. In its zeal to
ensure that Nikolic was prosecuted, the Appeals Chamber cobbled together a
series of ill-defined, ill-considered tests of dubious provenance and applied them
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to a murky set of facts. As a result, the decision of the Appeals Chamber will allow
future international criminal decision-making bodies to turn a blind eye to viola-
tions of human rights and state sovereignty in pursuit of the 'greater good'. More
worryingly, the absence of guidance and a tolerance of illegality means that there is
nothing to give pause to SFOR, its successor150 or other such forces before they
engage in illegal behaviour - or commission criminals or bounty hunters to do so
on their behalf - so long as it doesn't exceed what appears to be a very wide
margin of appreciation.
150. On 22 November 2004, the Security Council adopted a resolution welcoming the European
Union's intention to establish EUFOR as the legal successor to SFOR, UN Doc. S/RES/1575 (2004).
